I study how the principal's experience a¤ects the structure and e¢ ciency of decision processes in his organization. Organization-speci…c experience augments the principal's ability to verify recommendations presented to him by his agents and also make it easier for him to gather decision-relevant information. The e¤ects of an increase in these two abilities on the decentralization of decision-making and on the agents' initiative are shown to markedly di¤er. An increase in the principal's veri…cation ability leads to an increase in the share of the decisions made by the agent and to an increase in his initiative and is unambiguously bene…cial. In contrast, an increase in the principal's ability to gather information tends to lead to a larger share of the decisions made by the principal and discourages the agent's initiative.
Introduction
A substantial body of evidence shows that the career experience of top managers has a signi…cant e¤ect on their present actions and on the characteristics of the organization over which they preside. For example, Barker and Mueller (2002) …nd that …rms headed by CEOs with career experience in marketing or engineering/R&D tend to spend signi…cantly more on Preliminary draft. Comments are welcome. I thank Larry Kranich, Illoong Kwon, Ady Pauzner, Yossi Spiegel and the participants and seminar audiences at IDC Herzliya and Tel Aviv University for helpful comments.
y School of Economics, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya (IDC). E-mail: nadavl@idc.ac.il R&D and Xuan (2009) shows that the CEO job history has a signi…cant e¤ect on the capital allocation decisions in multidivisional …rms. From a practical perspective, understanding the role of such managerial …rm-speci…c (or industry-speci…c) experience is important in order to determine the requirements for managerial positions.
1 Should a search for a new CEO for example be limited to a narrow pool of internal candidates (with abundant …rm-speci…c experience) or expanded to include also external candidates who may lack …rm-speci…c experience? 2 Because there is often a tradeo¤ between experience and other goals (external candidates may be more talented or have more general managerial experience), the exact bene…ts of experience must be well-understood. 3 Understanding the role of experience is also important in order to quantify the bene…ts from organizational tools such as lateral job rotations, which are used by …rms to develop managerial talent and provide managers with a diversity of career experiences. In contrast to the ample empirical evidence, there is very little in terms of theoretical analysis of experience and its e¤ects. In this paper, I consider one salient aspect: how does the principal's experience a¤ect his authority relations with his subordinates (agents)? Speci…-cally, I ask what are the e¤ects on the organization's decision-processes, on the decentralization of decision-making from the principal to the agents and on the performance of the agents? The perspective I take follows the seminal work of Aghion and Tirole (1997) , who argue that decision processes within organizations are equilibrium outcomes that do not necessarily follow formal hierarchical lines. Actual decision-making is delegated to parties with the relevant information and organization members invest e¤ort in order to gain information and in ‡uence decisions over which they have di¤erent preferences. The allocation of real authority over decisions thus re ‡ects the relative costs of gathering information to di¤erent parties. The experience of the principal …gures to be a key factor in this regard, as it is central both to his ability to collect information by himself and also to his ability to disseminate and process 1 Similar questions arise also in other contexts, for example, regarding the experience quali…cations required from government cabinet ministers. In Israel, a heated public debate has erupted whether a politician lacking military background is quali…ed to serve as a defense minister. See, for example Ynet News "War report scathing for Olmert, Peretz" 29 April, 2007. 2 Ford Motor Co. has recently hired Alan Mulally as its new CEO. Prior to that Mulally has served his entire career at Boeing. Commentators noted that the nature of the business and the industry at Ford and the challenges he will faced with are very di¤erent than those he has witnessed in Boeing. See for example BusinessWeek Online, September 7, 2006. 3 It is interesting to note that the typical experience of a typical CEO have changed signi…cantly over the years and in correlation with changes in other elements of their strategy. Fligstein (1987) argues that multidivisional …rms have increasingly chosen CEOs with …nance background , at the same time as many of those …rms adopted a diversi…ed conglomerate form and a strategy of growth into unrelated product areas. In his sample of about of the 100 largest …rms in the US, he …nds that the percentage of managers with exclusive …nance background has risen from 11% in the 1950 to 28% in 1980. More recently, Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) have argued that there has been a shift in the relative importance of CEOs "managerial ability"(skills transferable across companies) and "…rm-speci…c human capital". information presented to him by his subordinates. A main contribution of this paper is to show that these distinct abilities have very di¤erent implications on the authority relations between the principal and his subordinates.
The model presented in Section 2 considers a hierarchy, composed of a principal (e.g. CEO; secretary of defense) and a single agent (e.g. division manager; military chief of sta¤). A single decision has to be taken (development of new product; a response to a military aggression by a neighboring state) and various alternative courses of action need to be evaluated. The principal's and agent's preferences over the desired course of action are not fully aligned (a division manager disregards potential con ‡icts between the new product and those of other divisions; a chief of sta¤ prefers a certain military alternative and may be less attuned to diplomatic considerations, number of casualties etc.) The decision process begins with the agent evaluating the alternatives. The agent then makes a recommendation to the principal. In some probability, the principal veri…es without an additional cost the payo¤ associated with the recommended action. The principal then has to decide how much to invest in evaluating alternatives himself. The principal overrules the agent if he is able to come up with a superior alternative and goes along with the agent's recommendation otherwise. Because of the sequential setup of the decision process the agent takes into consideration the e¤ect that his recommendation could have, if veri…ed, on the principal's incentives to invest e¤ort. As a result, the agent's recommendation is a "compromise" between his own preferred alternative and the principal's best option.
Section 3 considers how the principal's experience changes the outcomes of this game. An experienced principal has accumulated throughout his career knowledge that is relevant to the decision in hand, possibly while serving in the same position as the agent or in a similar one (for example, an experienced CEO may have previously served as head of the same division as his agent, the current manager. In contrast, an inexperienced CEO may have a …nance or legal background and thus lack much knowledge in the division business.) Experience matters in two distinct ways: First, due to his "technical" command of the subject, an experienced principal is more likely to verify the value of alternatives presented to him (veri…cation ability). Thus, a CEO with background in manufacturing is better-suited to assess the validity of engineering estimates of the cost of a new project than a CEO who lacks such knowledge (who would therefore need to take the estimates at face value, i.e. as "cheap talk"). Second, an experienced principal could more easily evaluate by himself other alternatives that were not presented to him by the agent (evaluation ability). This is represented by a decrease in the principal's marginal cost of e¤ort.
I show that an increase in the principal's experience, as manifested by an improvement in either one of these two abilities, induces the agent to recommend more favorable alternatives to the principal. The agent takes into account the e¤ect his recommendation could have, if veri…ed, on the subsequent choice of e¤ort by the principal and thus on the likelihood of the principal overruling him. An increase in the likelihood of veri…cation or a decrease in the marginal cost of the principal's e¤ort both serve to strengthen the agent's incentive to improve his recommendation.
However, the e¤ects of an increase in the principal's veri…cation ability are markedly di¤erent than those of an increase in his evaluation ability with respect to the principal's and agent's respective e¤orts and to the agent's real authority -the proportion of times in which the agent's recommendation is followed. An increase in the veri…cation ability leads the principal to exert less e¤ort and the agent to exert more e¤ort. The principal is thus more "trusting" of the agent and overrules him in less instances. Decision making becomes more decentralized. In contrast, an increase in the evaluation ability often leads to a decrease in the agent's e¤ort, to an increase in the principal's e¤ort and to a reduction in the agent's real authority. Because of the dampening e¤ect on the agent's initiative, the overall implications on the principal of an increase in his evaluation ability are ambiguous, whereas an increase in the principal's veri…cation ability leads unambiguously to higher utility both to the principal and to the agent.
In Section 4, I consider two extensions to the base model. First, I endogenize the principal's choice when to exert e¤ort (either after the agent as in the base model, or simultaneously with him). In addition, I posit that exerting e¤ort late in the decision process is more expensive, due to time constraints. I show that inexperienced managers (where experience is measured here by the veri…cation ability only) tend to intervene in the decision process in early stages, whereas experienced managers prefer to wait and allow the agent to move …rst. Second, I extend the base model to a include two agents who serve under the same principal (e.g. two division managers and a CEO). While the two agents are assigned to independent areas, their actions are strategically interdependent because the principal's e¤orts in the two areas are cost substitutes. I show that an increase in the principal's experience (again restricted to the veri…cation ability) induces both agents to improve their recommendations to the principal. However, the area in which the principal is more experienced becomes more "prominent". The principal curbs e¤ort in the area in which he is experienced, which allows him to focus more e¤ort the other area. This encourages the agent assigned to the …rst area to exert more e¤ort but discourages the other agent's initiative and leads to a decline in his real authority.
Relation to the literature
As discussed above, this paper follows the tradition of the authority model introduced by Aghion and Tirole (1997) . Papers in this literature 4 commonly assume that due to contract incompleteness, the degree of real authority that agents exert over decisions is a central factor in determining their initiative and have a strong impact on organizational outcomes. A crucial di¤erence with the Aghion-Tirole setup is that they assume that the principal and agent exert e¤ort simultaneously. As the agent's recommendation is only considered when the principal has failed to become informed, it will be followed whether it can be veri…ed or not. Consequently, as long as the parties are su¢ ciently congruent the agent always recommend his favorite outcome. In contrast, in our sequential setup, the agent's decision regarding the recommended value to the principal is strategic and is sensitive to the principal's characteristics such as the likelihood whether the recommendation is veri…ed or not. A recent paper by Armstrong and Vickers (2010) has a setup that is relatively similar to the current one. An agent observes several projects (the agent may need to exert e¤ort) and chooses one project to present to the principal, who can verify its value to both players. Monetary incentives are ruled out and the principal's and agent's ranking of projects di¤er. Armstrong and Vickers however consider the delegation of the decision right to the agent and study the properties of the optimal "permission set" of projects by the principal, who commits to approve only projects in this set. This paper is also related to a lesser extent to a large literature on the communication between an informed agent and uninformed decision maker, where the informational structure is exogenous. Crawford and Sobel (1982) , considers communication to be cheap talk. They …nd that communication is coarse and the informational value of communication decreases in the degree to which the preferences of the decision maker and agent diverge. Finally, in the literature on audit mechanisms, surveyed in La¤ont and Martimort (2002) , an uninformed principal can commit to a costly random audit which would verify the agent's report. However in contrast to here, the agent payo¤ can be made contingent on the audit and the agent thus always reports truthfully.
The model
Consider an hierarchy composed of an agent (A) and a principal (P). The hierarchy has to make a single decision. In addition to the CEO/division manager and secretary of defense examples discussed in the introduction, the setup can also apply to the relationships between a board of directors and a CEO, between a university tenure committee and an academic department (regarding the tenure decision for faculty) and other examples.
The agent is assigned to evaluate a large number of alternative courses of action. We take R + to be the set alternatives. Each alternative yields a monetary payo¤ v to the principal and a nonmonetary payo¤ u is to the agent. The agent's payo¤ stems from private bene…ts that may take the form of signaling his ability, enhancement of public image, perks, acquisition of skills etc. While the potential payo¤ possibilities are commonly known, it is initially unknown to both the principal and the agent which alternative is associated with which payo¤. Speci…cally, we assume that there exists a set R R of payo¤ pairs (v; u) known to both the principal and the agent. An alternative t 2 R + is assigned a payo¤ pair (v t ; u t ) 2 by function f : R + ! which is unknown ex ante to both players. Furthermore, for any (v; u) 2 there exists t such that f (t) = (v; u).
We further assume that the frontier of is di¤erentiable and can be represented by a concave function u (v), such that u 0 < 0 and u 00 0, de…ned over some interval [v; v] . We denote by u u(v) and u = u (v) the agent's payo¤ from the principal best and worst alternatives on the frontier, respectively. We will argue below that it is the frontier u (v) which matters for our analysis.
In addition to the alternatives above, we assume that an additional known default alternative can be taken which yields a payo¤ of zero to both the agent and principal. We assume that the preferences of the principal and the agent are su¢ ciently congruent so that each would prefer the other party's preferred alternative over the default alternative. i.e.:
Assumption 1 v 0 and u 0: In addition we assume that the set contains many outcomes which are signi…cantly worse to the players than the default option. Consequently, The parties would never pick an alternative randomly.
The principal and agent are risk neutral. However, the payo¤ to the principal v is noncontractible. It is thus infeasible for the principal to use monetary incentives to motivate the agent. The agent is therefore paid a …xed wage which is normalized to zero, and exerts e¤ort only to the extent that it a¤ects his private bene…ts.
The agent …rst investigates the valuations of di¤erent alternatives. If successful ("becomes informed") the agent learns the function f ( ) and thus the values (v t ; u t ) associated with every alternative t both to himself and to the principal. Otherwise the agent learns nothing. The agent can obtain a success probability i a by exerting e¤ort with a disutility c (i a ), where c is increasing and strictly convex. (For brevity I will often refer to i a as the agent's e¤ort). To simplify the exposition we assume that lim
The agent's utility if an alternative with a value u is implemented and if exerting e¤ort i a is thus
If the agent has failed to learn f ( ) he reports so. If successful, the agent recommends a single alternative t to the principal. The recommendation is accompanied by supporting evidence. However, the principal may nevertheless not be able verify the value to himself of the proposed alternative from the information presented to him. Speci…cally, assume that the principal will either verify v t without incurring any cost with probability x 2 [0; 1]. In any case, the principal is unable to infer from the recommendation any additional information regarding payo¤s from other alternatives that are not presented to him.
After receiving the agent's recommendation, the principal decides on the amount of resources he would dedicate to evaluating alternatives by himself. At a disutility cost c (i p ), the principal can learn the entire function f ( ) in probability i p , 5 where > 0 is a marginal cost shifter. If successful, the principal implements his preferred alternative and obtains a value v. Otherwise the agent's recommendation is implemented. The principal's utility is therefore
Modeling the principal' s experience Consider next the role played by the principal's experience. As discussed in the introduction, we envision the principal's experience a¤ecting two distinct abilities: …rst, an experienced principal is more capable evaluating and verifying hard information presented to him in support of a speci…c alternative. This idea is captured here by assuming that the probability x that the principal is able to verify (without cost) the value of an alternative presented to him by the agent is an increasing function of the principal's experience. This veri…cation ability determines the likelihood that the agent would be able, by his choice of which alternative to present, to in ‡uence the principal's e¤ort choice.
Second, an experienced principal is likely to …nd it easier to evaluate by himself additional alternatives which were not presented to him by the agent (his evaluation ability is higher). Assume therefore that the marginal cost of the principal's evaluation e¤ort is decreasing in his experience. Speci…cally, the parameter is lower the more experienced is the principal.
Proofs of all lemmas and propositions not in the text are relegated to the appendix.
Analysis

Preliminaries
Starting from the last stage, consider …rst the principal's choice of e¤ort to put into evaluating alternatives by himself. Denote by i p (v) the principal's e¤ort, conditional of verifying the agent's recommended alternative to be worth v to him. If the principal's investigation succeeds, he implements his ideal alternative and gain v. If not, he approves the agent's recommendation. Therefore
If the principal is unable to verify the agent's recommendation (with probability 1 x), his e¤ort choice i p (v ) is based on his belief v regarding the value of the agent's recommendation. If the agent has failed, the principal's e¤ort is i p (0). The …rst-order condition to the principal's problem is v v c
As c 00 0 then h 0 > 0 and thus i 0 p (v) 0. In addition we assume the following
This plausible assumption says that the responsiveness of the principal's e¤ort choice to the recommendation v is decreasing in the cost parameter , is satis…ed in many parametric examples. 6 Next, consider the agent's recommendation. If informed, the agent only recommends an alternative t associated with payo¤s (v t ; u t ) that lie on the frontier of the set , i.e. in f(v; u (v)) j v v vg. To see this, observe that the agent would not recommend an alternative if another alternative exists which yields higher payo¤ to himself and at least the same payo¤ to the principal. Similarly, if another alternative exist with the same value to the agent and a higher value to the principal, the agent would prefer to recommend that alternative as he may then induce the principal to reduce his e¤ort to evaluate alternatives himself (in the case the principal has veri…ed the recommendation). Hence recommendations that are not on the frontier are never optimal.
It is natural to refer to the agent as choosing directly the value v to o¤er the principal. His decision takes into account the e¤ect on the principal's subsequent e¤ort choice, in case the principal's is able to verify the value of the recommendation (in probability x). Denote the value to the principal of the agent's optimal recommendation by v . Under rational expectations, the principal anticipates v correctly even if unable to verify it. The agent's maximization problem is therefore
U is the expected gross payo¤ to the informed agent (without deducting the sunk cost of his e¤ort). We assume that U is concave as a function of v. Since the principal's e¤ort is i p (v ) whether he veri…ed the recommendation or not, the informed agent's gross payo¤ is
Whether the solution to (3) is on the interior of [v; v] depends on the model's parameters. For example, if the probability of veri…cation x is very small, the agent stands very little chance to in ‡uence the principal's e¤ort choice. He will therefore recommend his favorite alternative (with value v to the principal). If x is larger however, the agent's wishes to raise his recommendation v above v, in order to dissuade the principal from evaluating alternatives too vigorously.
The next condition is su¢ cient for the agent to bene…t from raising his recommendation above v (interior solution). 6 It is straightforward to show that @ i
. Substituting
Under Assumption 3, the optimal recommendation v is in the interior of [v; v] and is characterized by the …rst-order condition to (3). This condition can be rearranged as follows:
The intuition for this key equation is as follows. The agent faces a tradeo¤: a more favorable recommendation to the principal (higher v) results in lower payo¤ to the agent in the case in which the principal's investigation fails (whether the principal was able to verify the recommendation or not). This occurs in probability 1 i p (v ). The marginal loss in expected utility from a small increase in the recommendation is the term on the right. On the other hand, a higher recommendation also entices the principal's to lower his e¤ort if he is able to verify its value (probability x). The term on the left-hand side is the expected marginal bene…t to the agent of increasing his recommendation along the frontier and in the direction of v. As the principal puts less e¤ort, there are more instances (by i 0 p (v)) in which the principal is uninformed and the agent's recommendation is implemented. In these cases, the agent gains additional u (v) u units of utility. The recommendation is increased until this marginal bene…t of increasing the recommendation just equals the marginal loss.
Finally, the agent's e¤ort choice i a in the …rst stage is determined as follows:
The agent's choice of e¤ort takes into account his own subsequent choice regarding the alternative to recommend if successful and anticipates the principal's e¤ort choice conditional on the recommendation.
The e¤ects of a change in the principal' s experience
We now turn to investigate the e¤ect of a change in the principal's experience on the parties' e¤orts and on the (de-facto) decentralization of decision making within the hierarchy. Speci…cally, we measure the agent's real authority by the proportion of times in which his recommendation is followed and is not overruled by the principal.
Each one the e¤ects of experience discussed in the previous section is considered in turn, beginning with the e¤ect of an increase in the principal's evaluation ability, measured by a reduction in the marginal cost of the principal disutility from e¤ort .
Proposition 1 When the principal's is more capable of evaluating alternatives by himself ( lower).
i. The principal's e¤ort i p (v) is higher for any alternative worth v presented to him which he is able to verify.
ii. The value to the principal of the alternative recommended by the agent v , is strictly higher.
iii. If the principal's e¤ort i p (v ) does not decrease, the agent's e¤ort i a decreases,.
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An increase in the principal's ability to evaluate alternatives by himself serves as a "disciplining device" and reduces the agent's opportunism when informed. Because the principal's e¤ort will be higher for any given v (part 1 of the proposition), it is less likely he will remain uninformed, and thus the marginal cost to the agent of recommending a higher v is lower. The principal's choice of e¤ort is also more responsive to the agent's recommendation . The principal is thus able to elicit from the agent a recommendation with higher payo¤ to himself, in order to dissuade him from evaluating other alternatives too vigorously.
The probability that the principal overrules the agent and decides on the course of action by himself is i p (v ). The complement 1 i p (v ) measures the agent's real authority. As decreases, the change in the overruling rate is thus
Two opposing e¤ects are at work: the direct e¤ect has the principal put more e¤ort (given the same recommendation), and points towards a higher rate of overruling. But the agent takes this into account and improves his recommendation; This indirect (strategic) e¤ect induces the principal's to reduce his e¤ort. In general, it is di¢ cult to determine which of the e¤ects dominate. For parametric examples, calculations (presented in the appendix) show that the direct e¤ect dominates and that the principal's overrules the agent in more cases when more capable of evaluating alternatives himself.
Since the agent is "pushed" to recommend a better alternative to the principal, the return on the agent's e¤ort in the case he is not overruled diminishes. If in addition the overruling rate increases, the return to the agent's investment (and consequently his e¤ort) unambiguously goes down. The agent contribution to the hierarchy is thus "marginalized" twice: he is less active in evaluating alternatives and, if informed, his recommendations are carried out in less instances.
We now turn to the e¤ect of an increase in the principal's ability to verify the value of a speci…c alternative presented to him (his veri…cation ability). Recall that we posit that the experienced principal is more likely to be able to verify the value of a recommendation presented to him by the agent than an inexperienced one, and indicate this by an increase in the probability of veri…cation x.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the principal's veri…cation ability is improved (x higher). Then i. The value v to the principal from the alternative recommended by the agent is higher.
ii. The principal's e¤ort i p (v ) is lower, and he overrules the agent in fewer cases.
iii. The agent's e¤ort i a is higher.
iv. Both the principal's and the agent's utilities are higher.
An increase in the principal's veri…cation ability helps improve the communication between himself and the agent (this can be readily seen by comparing the case of x = 0 to the case of x = 1). The proposition shows that this improvement which is the result of the principal being more experienced leads to an outcome which is superior for both of them.
Observe from the …rst-order condition (5) that the agent's marginal bene…t of increasing his recommendation is increasing in the probability that it would a¤ect the principal's choice of e¤ort -x. Understanding this, the experienced principal's anticipates correctly that the agent's recommendation should be more favorable to him. He is thus "more trusting" of the agent and puts less e¤ort himself if unable to verify the agent's recommendation. Consequently the principal's is more often uninformed and the agent's real authority is higher. Even though the agent's recommendation is more favorable to the principal and thus less favorable to himself, the agent is better o¤ with an experienced principal than with an inexperienced one. To understand why, note that, facing an experienced principal, the agent could have acted exactly as he would optimally act with a less experienced principal. The agent would have been better o¤ facing the experienced principal under this strategy, as the principal puts less e¤ort himself when the recommendation is not veri…ed. As the agent nevertheless chooses a higher recommendation, it is clearly optimal for him to do so.
It is important to note the marked contrast in outcomes between Propositions 1 and 2. While in both cases the agent improves his recommendation when facing a more experienced principal, the e¤ect on the agent's e¤ort and his real authority due to an improvement in the principal's veri…cation ability is much di¤erent than the e¤ect due to an improvement in the principal's evaluating ability. An increase in the principal's ability evaluate the alternatives more easily himself can lead to a "crowding out" of the agent's e¤ort, which is replaced by the principal's. It is therefore possible for both the principal and the agent to be adversely a¤ected as a result. In contrast, the agent's real authority and e¤ort go up and both principal and the agent are bene…tted from an increase in the principal's veri…cation ability.
Discussion and Extensions
The preceding section has demonstrated that the principal's experience can have very di¤er-ent e¤ect on the outcomes, depending on whether it a¤ects the principal's ability to verify information presented by the agent, or the principal's ability to evaluate the decision by himself. Which one of this e¤ects is likely to be more prominent depends on the speci…c context. Note however that veri…cation and evaluation are tasks of quite di¤erent magnitude. Specifically, veri…cation of information regarding a speci…c alternative is a far less demanding and time-consuming than evaluating other alternatives from scratch (In analogy to the world of academics, one may think of the di¤erence between "verifying that a proof to a claim is correct" to "proving the claim yourself".). It seems plausible that whereas the principal's experience will always have a signi…cant e¤ect on the veri…cation ability, there may be cases in which its e¤ect on the evaluation ability is rather limited. These are cases in which, by the nature of the situation, the principal's ability to "take over" the agent's responsibilities are quite limited irrespective of his experience (for example, because he is overloaded with other more urgent duties, because of the urgency of the decision etc.).
I proceed to explore a couple of extensions to the base model.
Experience and managerial style
On top of to the variation in the intensity of the principal's involvement, di¤erent processes can also di¤er in the stage at which the principal intervenes. Indeed, it has been noted that managers can di¤er substantially in their decisions when to injects themselves into the decision process and how informed they wish to be kept at any point of time (Mintzberg (1973) ). Consider for example the development of concept for a new product. The manager can closely supervise the decision process from its inception, and be involved all of the main design decisions. Alternatively, he may allow his subordinates to develop the concept without consulting him and then bring it to him to …nal authorization, at which stage he may either allow the project continue, require modi…cations or reject it altogether. In this section, I incorporate into the model the principal's decision when to intervene and study how the optimal decision on this regard is related to the principal's experience (for the purpose of this section, experience is taken to a¤ect only the principal's veri…cation ability x ). I extend the previous model in two ways: …rst, the principal's choice when to exert e¤ort is endogenized. Speci…cally, I assume that the principal can choose to exert e¤ort either at the same time as the agent or, as in the basic model, only after the agent has conducted his evaluation and submitted a recommendation. Second, I assume that the cost to the principal is higher if exerting e¤ort at a late stage. Many decisions become more urgent as time passes (for example, a delay in the decision may result in the product not arriving in time for the peak demand season; an exogenous deadline has to be met; better supply sources may be secured by competitors unless the …rm acts fast etc.). Compared with the option of considering the alternatives in the early stages (and in a relatively unrushed manner) evaluating the alternatives late and over a short period of time requires a concentrated e¤ort from the principal and would commend much of his attention, leading to a diversion of attention from his other duties which may su¤er as a result.
Formally, denote the e¤ort exerted by the principal in the ex ante stage (i.e. at the same time as the agent) by i p 1 and by i p2 the e¤ort he exerts after receiving the agent's recommendation. The principal can exert e¤ort only in one of the two stages and thus i p1 i p2 = 0. We furthermore assume that the agent is aware whether i p1 > 0 or i p1 = 0 when choosing his own e¤ort although he is unable to observe the exact value of i p1 if it is positive. 8 The cost of i p1 to the principal is 1 c (i p1 ) whereas the cost of i p2 is 2 c (i p2 ), where 2 > 1 . Assume in addition that Assumption 3 holds for = 2 . Intuitively, the decision on the time of intervention depends on two opposing forces: Ignoring the increase in the cost of e¤ort over time, the principal gains by allowing the agent to evaluate the alternatives …rst and make a recommendation. By doing so he establishes a "credible promise" to curb the principal's intervention if the agent improves his recommendation. This also gives the agent stronger incentives to exert e¤ort. Since the cost of the principal's e¤ort increases over time, however, there is an opposing e¤ect which favors the principal exerting e¤ort early, knowing that the cost of thorough evaluation in the late stage would be high.
When the agent and the principal's e¤orts are taken simultaneously, the principal has no alternative but to follow the agent's recommendation when his own investigation fails and he remains uninformed. The agent's recommendation would be followed in this case whether it can be veri…ed or not. The outcome in this case is thus una¤ected by the principal's veri…cation ability. In contrast, we know from the preceding section that the outcome if the principal moves ahead is more favorable to the principal the higher is his veri…cation ability. This leads immediately to the next characterization, which shows how the timing of the principal's e¤ort depends on his experience.
Lemma 1 There exists e x 2 [0; 1] such that, for a principal with veri…cation ability x, i. if x e x there exists equilibrium in which the principal exerts e¤ort at the same time as the agent ( i p1 > 0 ). The principal's utility in this equilibrium is higher than in any other equilibria.
ii. if x > e x the principal exerts e¤ort after the agent (i p2 > 0 ) in all equilibria.
From the proof of the lemma (in the appendix), it can be seen that the principal's e¤ort tends to be much higher if exerted early than if exerted late, even if comparing principals with similar levels of experience (i.e. with values of x just above and below e x). The principal's e¤ort equals i p (i a v; 1 ) if exerted at the same time as the agent and i p (v ; 2 ) if following his recommendation, where i p (v; ) is de…ned as in (2).
, the agent's real authority is substantially reduced if the principal exerts e¤ort early.
The results of the previous section has shown that experienced managers are more trusting of their subordinates and tend to overrule them less. This tendency is reinforced when managers choose the time of intervention. Relatively inexperienced managers prefer to maintain tight control from early stages as they correctly perceive they would otherwise be faced with the option of exerting prohibitively costly e¤ort late to come up with alternatives to their agent's unsatisfactory recommendations. Early intervention implies that the principal's role is the decision process is much more pronounced, as he exerts far more e¤ort and the agent far less. Experienced managers in contrast are more con…dent in their ability to elicit favorable recommendations and thus less averse to intervening only late in the process.
Principal with several agents
In this section, I examine an environment in which the principal interacts with several agents (e.g., a CEO and several division heads), who are each assigned to a di¤erent task (e.g. different products, di¤erent geographical markets etc.). Tasks are independent from one another and do not compete on scarce resources. Therefore any interdependence between them stems only from the fact that the principal's e¤orts in the di¤erent areas are cost substitutes.
Speci…cally, assume that there are two agents (A1 and A2) and a single principal (P). The principal's cost of e¤ort is:
The agents are each assigned to an independent task (area). Each task is characterized as in Section 2 and with identical parameters.
In the interim stage, an agent i = 1; 2, if informed, presents a recommendation with value v i to the principal for an action in his area. For simplicity, we assume that the agents …rst publicly report if uninformed. If both are informed, the agents simultaneously present their recommendations. Given (v 1 ; v 2 ), the principal decides how much e¤ort to exert to evaluate alternative courses of action in each of the two areas respectively. The principal's e¤ort allocation problem is therefore
The solution to maximization problem is
Observe that the principal's e¤ort in each area is decreasing in the value of the recommendation made by the agent in charge of this area and increasing in the value of the recommendation of the other agent. The …rst e¤ect is the same e¤ect discussed in the single agent case. The second e¤ect is novel and is due to the cost substitutability between the principal's e¤ort in both areas.
The next lemma shows that the agents'recommendations are strategic complements.
Lemma 2 Let v 1 (v 2 ) and v 2 (v 1 ) denote the agents' best response functions in the interim stage when both agents are informed. Then @v 1 =@v 2 > 0 and @v 2 =@v 1 > 0.
The intuition for this result is as follows: an increase in v 2 lowers the return to the principal's e¤ort in task 2. The reduced e¤ort in task 2 lowers the principal's marginal cost of e¤ort in task 1. In analogy to the results of Proposition 1, this induces agent 1 to increase his own recommendation, v 1 :
We turn now to consider the e¤ect of the principal's experience in this setup. A salient aspect is the fact that principals are often more experienced in some areas which they oversee than in others. For example, this can be the result of a CEO functional experience as a division head. Alternatively, one area could be a mature business while the other a new …eld which the …rm has little experience in.
To formalize this idea, we consider the e¤ect of a change in the principal's experience in only one of the areas. We assume that the change in experience in one area has an e¤ect on the principal's veri…cation ability in that area, but not on his ability to evaluate by himself. Let x i denote the probability that the principal is able to verify agent i's recommendation, for i = 1; 2. We know that, in the single-agent framework, an increase in x leads the agent to improve his recommendation and the principal to put less e¤ort himself (Proposition 2). In the two-agents setup, the decrease in the principal's e¤ort in area i thus implies that the principal's marginal cost of e¤ort in task j is diminished. We can expect the e¤ect on agent j's behavior to be equivalent to that of a reduction in the marginal cost of principal's e¤ort in the single agent case (Proposition 1). Indeed, the …rst part of Lemma 3 below shows that since @v i =@x i > 0 (by Proposition 2), and given the strategic complementarity between recommendations established above, @v j =@x i > 0 as well. Thus, both recommendations are improved if the principal is more experienced in only one area.
Next, we make the following assumption with respect to the ex ante choice of e¤orts
Assumption 4 Agents'e¤orts are strategic substitutes.
The assumption states that the gain for an agent from becoming informed ("return of e¤ort") is higher when the other agent is uninformed. This is likely to be the case for two reasons: …rst, the payo¤ in case the agent is uninformed is higher if the other agent is informed, because the principal can devote more of his own e¤ort to the agent's area (recall the partial congruency between the agent and principal, which implies that the agent wants the principal e¤ort to be highest as possible in this case). Second, if the agent is informed, he is likely to be better o¤ if the principal's marginal cost of e¤ort is higher, which is the case if the other agent is uninformed, and the principal has put additional e¤ort in that area. The second part of Lemma 3 shows that, under this condition, when the principal experience in area i increases, the e¤ort of agent j diminishes.
Lemma 3 Suppose that the principal's experience in area i increases (x i is higher). Then both agents' recommendations, in case both are informed, increase. The agent in charge of area i's e¤ort increases, while the e¤ort of the agent in charge of area j decreases.
An increase in the principal's experience in one area results in an increase in "prominence" of the unit assigned to this area, at the expense of the other unit. Speci…cally, this unit enjoys more real authority and therefore its e¤ort and overall contribution to the organization increase. The free monitoring "resources" are used by the principal to monitor the other unit's area more closely. While this does discipline that unit to make more palatable recommendations, it also diminishes its initiative and e¤ort. Roberts (2004) discusses the allocation of resources within …rms between units in charge of exploration of new areas and units devoted to the exploitation of existing ones (p. 273). There is a stark asymmetry in the information that top-level executives have access to in the two areas. Exploitation groups are able to document their cases, and executives, who typically have signi…cant experience in those areas, can easily process those. In contrast, exploration groups will have much more di¢ cult time quantifying the expected cash ‡ow from resources which are allocated to them. Roberts notes that this may tend to bias decisions in favor of the established, performance oriented businesses.
A Parametric example
In this section we provide a parametric example for the model outlined in Section 2. Let c (i) = 0:5i 2 and let u (v) = p 1 v 2 , v = 0 and v = 1 (unit circle). It is straightforward to show that i p (v) = (1 v) = in this case. Since the function c does not satisfy the Inada condition we thus further assume that > 1 to ensure i p (v) < 1 for all v. Substituting into the …rst-order condition 5 , we get
from which it can be shown after some calculations that 
B Proofs
Proofs of all lemmas and propositions not in the text follow.
Proof of Proposition 1. Assume that decreases.
ii. Recall the …rst-order condition (5) which implicitly determines v .
Di¤erentiating this expression with respect to v we obtain @ 2 U =@v
where the …rst term is the derivative taking i p (v ) as given (as in the maximization problem (3)) and the second term is the e¤ect through i p (v ). As @ 2 U =@v 2 0 by assumption, the full derivative is decreasing in v . Suppose now that, beginning from an initial value by v , diminishes. Then i p (v ) increases and thus also the entire second term (which is negative). In addition, as @ i 0 p (v) =@ 0, the …rst term increases as well. Thus it is necessary for v to increase for the …rst-order condition to hold.
iii. Observe …rst that the agent's e¤ort is determined by the …rst-order condition to the maximization problem (6),
As c 00 > 0, as decreases, the change in i a has the same sign as the change in U i p (0) u.
Applying the envelope theorem to (3), it follows that
As (7) and rearranging, we obtain
Thus, a weaker su¢ cient condition for i a to increase when decreases is @i
The condition is clearly satis…ed if x is su¢ ciently large.
Proof of Proposition 2.
i. Recall the …rst-order condition (5) which implicitly determines v .
and recall from the proof of Proposition 1 that the expression on the left-hand side is decreasing as a function of v: Denote the initial value by v . As x increases, the left hand side increased. Hence v has to increase for the …rst-order condition to hold.
ii. As @v =@x > 0 by part 1, then
The principal overruling rate i p (v ) is thus lower.
iii. The agent's e¤ort i a , satis…es c 0 (i a ) = U i p (0) u. Observe …rst that the agent's payo¤ if he fails, i p (0) u, does not depend on x. Consider next the e¤ect of a change in x on U , the payo¤ if successful . Applying the Envelope Theorem to (3), the e¤ect on this payo¤ of a change in v is a second-order one. The e¤ect through i p is a …rst-order e¤ect. Thus
The agent's screening intensity i a , is thus an increasing function of the di¤erence U i p (0) u and therefore increases in x.
iv. The principal's ex ante utility is:
By the envelope theorem, as @v =@x > 0; then i p v + 1 i p v c i p is increasing in x: As i a increases in x as well and given that i
; by revealed preference, we obtain the result.
The agent's ex ante utility is the value of (6)
By the envelope theorem,
Proof of Lemma 1. It is useful to consider …rst an equilibrium of a one-stage game in which the principal and agent exert e¤ort simultaneously. In the equilibrium of such game, the principal's best alternative v is implemented if the principal becomes informed, and the agent's best alternative (with value v to the principal) is implemented if the principal remains uninformed and the agent is informed. The e¤ort levels e i p1 ; e i a are therefore determined as a solution to the system of equations:
Consider next a potential equilibrium of the two-stage game with i p1 > 0. Because the choice of P 's e¤ort is not observed by A (expect for whether it is positive or not), i p1 , if positive, is a best-response to i a . Similarly, i a is a best response to i p1 . The e¤ort levels in this case are therefore equal to those in the simultaneous game. Denote the value that would be obtained by the principal in such equilibrium by V 1 . Because the principal's experience x does not come into play if i p1 > 0, V 1 is invariant in x. In contrast, if i p1 = 0, then the unique equilibrium of the continuation game is identical to that described in Section 2. Thus, if an equilibrium with i p1 = 0 exists, we know from Proposition 2 that the payo¤ to the principal in this equilibrium, V 2 (x), strictly increases in x:
Denote therefore by e x the level of x such that V 2 (x) V 1 if and only if x e x (note that e x = 0 and e x = 1 are possible). If x > e x, an equilibrium with i p1 > 0 cannot exist. The value obtained by the principal in such equilibrium, V 1 , is strictly below V 2 (x) which he would obtain if deviating to i p1 = 0. In all possible equilibrium thus i p1 = 0 and i p 2 = i p (v ) as in the previous section. Such equilibrium can be supported for example by an out-of-equilibrium belief by the agent that the principal has chosen e i p1 if he observes i p1 = 0. If x < e x, then there exists an equilibrium in which the principal and agent choose i p1 = e i p1 and i a = e i a respectively. If the principal where to deviate to i p1 = 0 he would obtain V 2 (x) which is smaller than the equilibrium payo¤ V 1 . If other equilibria with i p1 = 0 exist, the principal obtains a lower value in them.
Proof of Lemma 2. Denote agent 1's payo¤, conditional on both agents being successful, by U yy 1 .
and similarly de…ne U yy 2 for agent 2. It is known (see for example Tirole (1988) , p. 208) that v 1 and v 2 are strategic complements if and only if @ 2 U yy i =@v i @v j > 0 for i = 1; 2 and j 6 = i. As can be seen from (8), @i p i =@v i = 1= 1 2 , @i p i =@v j = = 1 2 and @ 2 i p i =@v i @v j = 0, for i = 1; 2 and j 6 = i. After some derivations we obtain
Thus, the condition is satis…ed at any intersection (v 1 ; v 2 ) of the best-response functions, provided (su¢ cient condition) =(1 2 ) < 2 or < 0:78. In this case the intersection is unique.
Proof of Lemma 3. Consider the …rst-order conditions charcterizing the recommendations in the case both agents are informed (v For concreteness, consider the e¤ect of a small increase in x 2 . Di¤erentiating the equations above and applying Cramer's law we obtain @v . These conditions state that the gain to an agent from becoming informed is larger when the other agent is uninformed.
When agent 2 fails, the principal's e¤ort in area 2 is higher for every level of v 1 , and so is his marginal cost of e¤ort. Thus the conditions U Provided the best-responses are downward sloping (Assumption 4) we now show that agent 2's e¤ort i a2 in increasing in x 2 whereas agent 1 e¤ort i a1 is decreasing. We …rst show based on (9) that @i a1 (i a2 )/@x 2 < 0. Note …rst that U Thus @U yy 1 =@x 2 < 0. The left-hand side of (9) is thus increasing in x 2 . As c 00 > 0, @i a1 (i a2 )/@x 2 < 0. Similarly, @i a 2 (i a 1 )/@x 2 > 0. This follows from (10) given that @U yy 2 =@x 2 > 0 and @U ny 2 =@x 2 > 0. Finally, de…ne i a1 and i a2 as the solution to the system of equations (9)-(10). As the bestresponse functions are downward-sloping and given that @i a1 (i a2 )/@x 2 < 0 and @i a 2 (i a 1 )/@x 2 > 0, it follows i a 2 increases and i a 1 decreases in x 2 .
